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I. INTRODUCTION
Smith v. Columbus Community Hospital' is the Nebraska
Supreme Court's most recent reaffirmation of the traditional rule that
no cause of action may be brought on behalf of a stillborn child2 under
the Nebraska wrongful death statute.3 The court disregarded the sig-
nificant trend in other jurisdictions favoring the recognition of a statu-
tory cause of action for the wrongful death of a stillborn child.
This Note analyzes the significance of the court's holding and criti-
cizes its rationale. The Note begins by outlining the majority and dis-
senting opinions in Smith, including the general holding of the case
and the basic arguments used by the majority and dissenting opinions.
Second, the Note analyzes the logic of the majority's justification for
refusing to recognize the cause of action, including its interpretation of
the Nebraska wrongful death statute, its reliance on previous Ne-
braska cases on this issue, its neglect of evidence of medical advances
in the study of fetal development and birth, and its failure to consider
the persuasive opinions of those jurisdictions which have allowed a
statutory cause of action for wrongful death of a viable, stillborn child.
The Note concludes that the court is clinging to outdated precedent
and ignoring advances in medical science to justify its refusal to recog-
nize this cause of action.
II. SMITH v. COLUMBUS COMMUNITY HOSPITAL
A. Facts and Issues
On October 17, 1982, Barbara Smith was admitted to Columbus
Community Hospital. Later that same day, Mrs. Smith delivered a
stillborn, male infant. Mrs. Smith subsequently brought suit in Platte
County District Court alleging that the infant's death was caused by
the negligence of the hospital and its staff. Mrs. Smith claimed that
nurses in the hospital's employ failed (1) to properly monitor fetal
heart tones; (2) to promptly and properly notify Mrs. Smith's physi-
cian of Mrs. Smith's admission to the hospital; and (3) to assemble an
emergency surgical team for a cesarian section when it became appar-
ent that the infant could not be delivered normally. Mrs. Smith's com-
plaint alleged the defendant's negligence proximately resulted in the
death of her unborn child.4
As the personal representative of the deceased child's estate, Mrs.
1. 222 Neb. 776, 387 N.W.2d 490 (1986).
2. A stillborn child is defined as "[a] child born dead or in such an early stage of
pregnancy as to be incapable of living though not actually dead at the time of
birth." BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 1268 (5th ed. 1979).
3. NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-809 (1985).




Smith sought recovery of general damages under the cause of action
created by the Nebraska wrongful death statute in the form of loss of
comfort, companionship, and society, as well as special damages in the
form of funeral expenses. The hospital demurred to Mrs. Smith's peti-
tion for failing to state a cause of action upon which relief could be
granted. The District Court for Platte County sustained the hospital's
demurrer, and when Mrs. Smith refused to replead, the. court dis-
missed her action.5
On appeal, the Nebraska Supreme Court focused on the issue of
whether the personal representative of the estate of an unborn, viable
fetus who dies prior to birth as the result of another's negligence has a
cause of action for damages under the wrongful death statute.6
B. Majority Opinion
The court held that an unborn child does not have a cause of action
under the wrongful death statute and affirmed the trial court's dismis-
sal of Mrs. Smith's action.7 The court noted that the same issue had
already been raised in Drabbels v. Skelly Oil Co.8 and Egbert v.
Wenzl 9, and that in both cases the court had refused to allow a cause
of action for the wrongful death of a stillborn child.10
The court quoted extensively from both the Drabbels and Egbert
opinions in justifying its denial of the cause of action in Smith. The
court cited Drabbels to make three arguments to rationalize its hold-
ing. The first argument relied on Drabbels' interpretation of Ne-
braska's wrongful death statute."1 Drabbels held the statute
specifically required that in order to maintain a cause of action on be-
half of the deceased for his wrongful death, the deceased must have
been a "person" able to maintain a cause of action for his injuries if he
had not died.12 In the case of fatal injuries to a child before birth, the
court held that the common law did not recognize an unborn child as a
"person."13 Drabbels therefore found that the personal representative
could not bring a wrongful death action on behalf of the child.14
The second argument given by Smith and supported by Drabbels
was the traditional doctrine that the unborn child is a part of the
mother with no separate juridical existence until the child is born
5. See iai at 777, 387 N.W.2d at 491.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 778-80, 387 N.W.2d at 491-92.
8. 155 Neb. 17, 50 N.W.2d 229 (1951).
9. 199 Neb. 573, 260 N.W.2d 480 (1977).
10. Smith v. Columbus Community Hosp., 222 Neb. 776, 777-80, 387 N.W.2d 490, 491-
92 (1986).
11. Id. at 778, 387 N.W.2d at 491.
12. Drabbels v. Skelly Oil Co., 155 Neb. 17, 19, 50 N.W.2d 229, 230 (1951).
13. Id. at 22-23, 50 N.W.2d at 232.
14. Id. at 23, 50 N.W.2d at 232.
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alive.15 The third argument from Drabbels was that there was no con-
vincing authority that a child born dead was ever a "person" in the law
of torts.
1 6
Smith cited Egbert for arguments relating to the intent of the Ne-
braska Legislature in enacting the wrongful death statute.17 Egbert
had concluded the common-law rule at the time of the adoption of
Nebraska's statute was that an unborn fetus was not a person within
the law of torts. The court in Egbert stated that if the legislature had
intended to include an unborn child in its definition of "person" in the
statute, the legislature could have drafted the statute to specifically
include the unborn child.18 Smith also cited to legislative inaction
since Drabbels as evidence of the legislature's intent to ratify the
Drabbels holding.19
Smith further indicated that the plaintiff had failed to present any
convincing evidence that the legislature had intended to include a fe-
tus within the wrongful death statute's protection and that such a
change in the interpretation of the statute allowing a cause of action to
lie on behalf of an unborn child should be made by the Nebraska
Legislature.2 0
C. Dissenting Opinion
° Justice Shanahan dissented, advocating a recognition by the Ne-
braska Supreme Court of a statutory cause of action for wrongful
death of a viable, unborn fetus.21 The dissent criticized the majority
for relying on the old rule in Drabbels and Egbert and for disregarding
the clear, rational trend in favor of recognizing this cause of action.22
The dissent observed that in 1985 twenty-nine states and the District
of Columbia recognized a statutory cause of action for the wrongful
death of a viable, stillborn child.23
15. Smith v. Columbus Community Hosp., 222 Neb. 776, 778, 387 N.W.2d 490, 491
(1986) (citing Drabbels v. Skelly Oil Co., 155 Neb. 17, 22, 50 N.W.2d 229, 232
(1951)).
16. Id. at 778, 387 N.W.2d at 491-92 (citing Drabbels v. Skelly Oil Co., 155 Neb. 17, 23,
50 N.W.2d 229, 232 (1951)).
17. Id. at 778-80, 387 N.W.2d at 492 (citing Egbert v. Wenzl, 199 Neb. 573, 260 N.W.2d
480 (1977)).
18. Egbert v. Wenzl, 199 Neb. 573, 575-76, 260 N.W.2d 480, 482 (1977).
19. See Smith v. Columbus Community Hosp., 222 Neb. 776, 779, 387 N.W.2d 490, 492
(1986) (citing Egbert v. Wenzl, 199 Neb. 573, 575-76 260 N.W.2d 480, 481-82 (1977)).
20. See id at 779-80, 387 N.W.2d at 492.
21. Id. at 780-82, 387 N.W.2d at 492-93 (Shanahan, J., dissenting).
22. Id. at 780, 387 N.W.2d at 492-93.
23. Id. at 781, 387 N.W.2d at 493 (citing Amadio v. Levin, 509 Pa. 199, 203, 501 A.2d
1085, 1086-87 & n.3 (1985)). Cf., Note, A Wrongful Death Action Can Be Main-
tained for Prenatal Injuries Causing the Stillbirth of a Fetus: Witty v. American
General Capital Distributors, 17 TEX. TEcH. L. REv. 983, 997 n.121 (33 jurisdic-
tions including the District of Columbia recognize an action for the wrongful
[Vol. 68:867
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After noting that the old rule was based on the difficulty of proving
causation due to the lack of medical information available at that time,
the dissent observed that today causation can be proven with more
exactness as a result of advances in medical science.24 The dissent ar-
gued that in light of this increase in medical knowledge, the denial of a
cause of action for the wrongful death of an unborn, viable fetus is no
longer justifiable.25
The dissent also cited Summerfield v. Superior Court 26 in recog-
nizing a statutory action for the wrongful death of a viable, stillborn
child. The dissent cited with approval Summerfield's argument that
based on medical science today, viability should determine when the
tort law recognizes an unborn fetus as a person. 27
III. ANALYSIS
A. Nebraska's Wrongful Death Statute
1. History of Statutory Recovery for Wrongful Death
Wrongful death statutes create a cause of action unknown at com-
mon law.28 The common-law rule against recovery for wrongful death
dates back to the English case of Baker v. Bolton29 wherein the court
stated that "[i]n a civil Court, the death of a human being could not be
complained of as an injury."3 0 This rule was based on the English "fel-
ony merger" rule in existence since 1607 which disallowed civil recov-
ery for an act that constituted both a tort and a felony.3 ' The practical
reason for this rule was that English law punished all felonies by
death, and upon conviction the criminal was required to forfeit all
death of a fetus, 9 jurisdictions do not recognize such an action, and 9 others have
not considered the issue)[hereinafter Note, Witty]; Note, No Wrongful Death Re-
covery for a Viable Unborn Fetus in North Carolina: DiDonato v. Wortman, 16
N.C. CENT. L.J. 207, 214 (1987) (as of 1985, 33 jurisdictions allowed recovery for
the wrongful death of a viable fetus)[hereinafter Note, DiDonato].
24. Smith v. Columbus Community Hosp., 222 Neb. 776, 781, 387 N.W.2d 490, 493
(1986) (Shanahan, J., dissenting).
25. Id. (citing Amadio v. Levin, 509 Pa. 199, 203-04, 501 A.2d 1085, 1087 (1985)).
26. 144 Ariz. 467, 698 P.2d 712 (1985) (en banc).
27. Smith v. Columbus Community Hosp., 222 Neb. 776, 782, 387 N.W.2d 490, 493
(1986) (Shanahan, J., dissenting) (citing Summerfield v. Superior Court, 144 Ariz.
467, 477, 698 P.2d 712, 722 (1985)).
28. Mabe v. Gross, 167 Neb. 593, 595, 94 N.W.2d 12, 15 (1959); Note, DiDonato, supra
note 23, at 207. Cf. Rhein v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 210 Neb. 321,324,314 N.W.2d
19, 21-22 (1982); Murray v. Omaha Transfer Co., 95 Neb. 175, 145 N.W. 360 (1914),
adhered to former opinion, 98 Neb. 482, 153 N.W. 488 (1915). See generally 1 S.
SPEISER, RECOVERY FOR WRONGFUL DEATH §§ 1:8-1:9 (2d ed. 1975) (discussion of
origin of wrongful death actions).
29. 1 Camp. 493, 170 Eng. Rep. 1033 (1808) (Nisi Prius).
30. Id. at 493, 170 Eng. Rep. at 1033.
31. 1 S. SPEISER, supra note 28, § 1:2, at 6-8 & n.7.
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property to the government. 32 In 1846, England adopted the Fatal Ac-
cidents Act, also known as Lord Campbell's Act, which allowed recov-
ery for wrongful death by close relatives of the decedent. 33 The statute
was highly influenced by the need to prevent an incentive for the
tortfeasor to kill rather than merely injure his victim in order to avoid
tort liability to the family of the victim. 34
American courts adopted the Baker rule and every state eventually
adopted wrongful death statutes.3 5 All states today have some form of
a wrongful death statute which either preserves the decedent's cause
of action and is brought by the executor of the decedent's estate,36 or
creates a separate cause of action to be brought by the decedent's "per-
sonal representative for the benefit of statutorily designated benefi-
ciaries."37 Nebraska's wrongful death statute3S is a pure, wrongful
death statute, creating a new cause of action to be "brought by and in
the name of [the decedent's] personal representatives, for the exclu-
sive benefit of the widow or widower and next of kin."39
2. Common-Law Cause of Action for Wrongful Death?
The Smith majority reiterated its longstanding principle that re-
covery for wrongful death does not exist in Nebraska absent the
wrongful death statute.4 0 However, such a traditional rule may not be
valid in Nebraska. The Arizona Supreme Court in Summerfseld v.
Superior Court 41 argued that a cause of action may exist today at com-
32. Id.
33. 1 S. SPEISER, supra note 28, § 1:8; Note, 8 U. PUGET SOUND L. REv. 103, 105 & n.16
(1984).
34. Note, supra note 33, at 104-05 & n.15.
35. 1 S. SPEIsER, supra note 28, § 1:9.
36. This type of statute is commonly referred to as a "survival-type" wrongful death
statute. Note, supra note 33, at 105 n.18.
37. This type of statute is simply referred to as a wrongful death statute. See Note,
supra note 33, at 105 & nn.18-19. Cf. 1 S. SPEISER, supra note 28, §§ 1:13-1:14 (dis-
cussing wrongful death statutes and other special legislation).
38. Nebraska's wrongful death statute provides:
Whenever the death of a person shall be caused by the wrongful act,
neglect or default, of any person, company or corporation, and the act,
neglect or default is such as would, if death had not ensued, have entitled
the party injured to maintain an action and recover damages in respect
thereof, then, and in every such case, the person who, or company or
corporation which would have been liable if death had not ensued, shall
be liable to an action for damages, notwithstanding the death of the per-
son injured, and although the death shall have been caused under such
circumstances as amount in law to felony.
NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-809 (1985).
39. NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-810 (1985). See Mabe v. Gross, 167 Neb. 593, 595-96, 94
N.W.2d 12, 15 (1959).
40. Smith v. Columbus Community Hosp., 222 Neb. 776, 779, 387 N.W.2d 490, 492
(1986) (citing Egbert v. Wenzl, 199 Neb. 573, 574, 260 N.W.2d 480, 481 (1977)).
41. 144 Ariz. 467, 698 P.2d 712 (1985).
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mon law for wrongful death, thus eliminating the need for the statu-
tory cause of action.42 However, the court in Summerfield did not
specifically hold that such an action existed because it was unneces-
sary since the court found that a stillborn fetus had a cause of action
under that state's wrongful death statute.43
In developing the argument for a common-law wrongful death
cause of action, Summerfield stated that because American courts
never adopted the felony merger rule, American courts' reliance on
English common law disallowing recovery for wrongful death was per-
haps misplaced.44 Summerfield reasoned that the existence of wrong-
ful death statutes in all American jurisdictions had become so
pervasive and longstanding that recovery for wrongful death had be-
come a general legislative policy and part of the common law.45 Sum-
merfield also noted that the Arizona Legislature had not intended to
occupy the entire field of wrongful death recovery through the enact-
ment of the wrongful death statute, and the judiciary was therefore
free to develop a cause of action for wrongful death under the com-
mon law.46 The court noted the statute had changed very little over
the years.47 Additionally, the Arizona Supreme Court had actively en-
tered the field of interpretation of the statute with judicial divinations
and clarifications.48 The court concluded that it was not actually cre-
ating such a common-law cause of action for wrongful death; the court
was entitled to participate through the common law in the evolution
and growth of the statutory cause of action.49
The Nebraska Supreme Court could have relied on a common-law
cause of action for wrongful death to allow the survivors of a stillborn
child to recover for the child's wrongful death. This theory would
have eliminated the need to deny the cause of action altogether be-
cause the Nebraska Legislature had failed to specifically provide for
such recovery. At the least, Smith could have recognized that the ju-
diciary was entitled to participate in the evolution and growth of the
statutory cause of action for wrongful death.
42. Id. at 470-72, 698 P.2d at 715-17.
43. Id. at 473, 698 P.2d at 718.
44. Id. at 471, 698 P.2d at 716. See also Amadio v. Levin, 509 Pa. 199, 221-24, 501 A.2d
1085, 1096-97 (1985) (Zappala, J., concurring) (the refusal by courts to recognize a
common-law action to recover for wrongful death were based on unsound reason-
ing in that felony merger doctrine was never adopted).
45. Summerfield v. Superior Court, 144 Ariz. 467, 471-72, 698 P.2d 712, 716-17 (1985).
See also Mone v. Greyhound Lines, 368 Mass. 354, 358-59, 331 N.E.2d 916, 918-19
(1975) (recognizing a common-law theory of wrongful death recovery).
46. Summerfield v. Superior Court, 144 Ariz. 467, 472, 698 P.2d 712, 717 (1985).
47. Id.
48. Id. at 472-73, 698 P.2d at 717-18.
49. Id. at 473, 698 P.2d at 718.
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3. Contrasting Interpretations of Wrongful Death Statutes
Smith held that an unborn child was not a "person" for purposes of
the Nebraska wrongful death statute:
The wrongful death statute is plain in stating that the right of action cre-
ated by it exists only in cases wherein the injured person could himself have
maintained an action for damages had he lived ....
In our opinion a child born dead cannot maintain an action at common
law for injuries received by it while in its mother's womb, and consequently
the personal representative cannot maintain it under a wrongful death statute
limiting such actions to those which would, if death had not ensued, have enti-
tled the party injured to maintain an action and recover damages in respect
thereof.50
This statement merely begs the question of whether a cause of ac-
tion exists under the Nebraska wrongful death statute by the personal
representative of a stillborn child. Smith inferred that because a child
born dead did not survive the prenatal injury long enough to maintain
an action for its injuries, it did not fit within the requirement of the
statute that the "wrongful act, neglect or default, of any person... is
such as would, if death had not ensued, have entitled the party injured
to maintain an action and recover damages in respect thereof."51
Smith concluded that if the child born dead could not bring its own
cause of action, there was no action to survive the child's death to be
brought by the personal representative of the child's estate.52 This il-
logical statement is equivalent to saying that a tortiously injured adult
who dies of tortiously inflicted injuries could not have maintained an
action at common law for his mortal injuries because he was dead
before he could bring the action.
However, other courts with nearly identical wrongful death stat-
utes have come to exactly the opposite conclusion. By way of exam-
ple, the Arizona Supreme Court in Summerjield v. Superior Court
found that a stillborn fetus could be considered a "person" within the
Arizona wrongful death statute.5 3 The court interpreted the language
50. Smith v. Columbus Community Hosp., 222 Neb. 776, 778, 387 N.W.2d 490, 491
(1986) (quoting Drabbels v. Skelly Oil Co., 155 Neb. 17, 19, 21, 50 N.W.2d 229, 230-
31 (1951)) (emphasis added).
51. NEB. REv. STAT. § 30-809 (1985) (emphasis added).
52. Smith v. Columbus Community Hosp., 222 Neb. 776, 778, 387 N.W.2d 490, 491-92
(1986) (citing Drabbels v. Skelly Oil Co., 155 Neb. 17, 19,21-24,50 N.W.2d 229, 230-
32 (1951)).
53. 144 Ariz. 467, 698 P.2d 712 (1985). The Arizona wrongful death statute provides:
When death of a person is caused by wrongful act, neglect or default,
and the act, neglect or default is such as would, if death had not ensued,
have entitled the party injured to maintain an action to recover damages
in respect thereof, then, and in every such case, the person who or the
corporation which would have been liable if death had not ensued shall
be liable to an action for damages, notwithstanding the death of the per-
son injured, and although the death was caused under such circum-
WRONGFUL DEATH
of the statute to require that the deceased have been able to maintain
an action for the injury against the defendant "if death had not en-
sued."54 The court in Summerfzeld stated that if the stillborn, viable
fetus had lived to be born, the injury received by the child prenatally
would have been actionable.5 5 In essence, Summerfl d, holds that
had the child not died in the womb from the injuries sustained
prenatally, the child would have lived to recover for his or her inju-
ries. The Rhode Island Supreme Court in Presley v. Newport Hospi-
tal 56 used this same reasoning to allow recovery under its wrongful
death statute5 7 by a stillborn, nonviable fetus.58
The reasoning in Summerfield and Presley is the more logical anal-
ysis of the statutes' requirement that the deceased must have been
able to maintain an action for his or her injuries had the victim sur-
vived the tortious conduct causing the injury. The intent of this re-
quirement was that the conduct be actionable under general tort
principles; it is not a requirement that the injured, deceased party be
able tobring the action at the exact time of the tortious injury.59
B. Criticism of the Smith v. Columbus Community Hospital Reasoning
Smith failed to make any new arguments, to look at any new medi-
cal evidence since Drabbels or Egbert, or to examine the well-reasoned
opinions among the majority trend in other jurisdictions recognizing a
stillborn fetus as a person within wrongful death statutes.
1. Smith's Misplaced Reliance on Drabbels and Egbert
Smith quoted extensively from Drabbels and Egbert and provided
no new analysis of the decision whether to retain the traditional rule
disallowing statutory actions by a stillborn child for wrongful death.
stances as amount in law to murder in the first or second degree or
manslaughter.
ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 12-611 (1982).
54. Summerfield v. Superior Court, 144 Ariz. 467, 475, 698 P.2d 712, 720 (1985).
55. Id.
56. 117 R.I. 177, 365 A.2d 748 (1976).
57. The Rhode Island wrongful death statute provides:
Whenever the death of a person shall be caused by the wrongful act,
neglect, or default of another, and the act, neglect, or default is such as
would, if death had not ensued, have entitled the party injured to main-
tain an action and recover damages in respect thereof, the person who, or
the corporation which, would have been liable if death had not ensued
shall be liable to an action for damages, notwithstanding the death of the
person injured, and although the death shall have been caused under
such circumstances as amount in law to a felony.
R.L GEN. LAWS § 10-7-1 (1985).
58. Presley v. Newport Hosp., 117 R.I. 177, 181-84, 365 A.2d 748, 750-53 (1976).
59. See O'Grady v. Brown, 654 S.W.2d 904, 910-11 (Mo. 1983) (en banc).
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Therefore, an analysis of the arguments in these two cases provides
support for criticism of the Smith rationale.
a. Analysis of Drabbels
Drabbels was the first case brought on behalf of a stillborn child for
wrongful death recovery under the Nebraska statute. The case arose
when an unborn, viable fetus was stillborn as a result of the explosion
of a container of gas produced by the defendant. The personal repre-
sentative of the unborn child's estate brought the action under the
wrongful death statute, and after sustaining a demurrer to the plain-
tiff's petition, the District Court of Sheridan County dismissed the
case.
60
Drabbels first noted that a numeric count of the jurisdictions decid-
ing this issue found the number allowing such an action to be a small
minority.61 The court then cited to Dietrich v. Northampton 62 for the
early common-law rule that an unborn child is part of its mother and
has no separate existence in the eyes of the law until live birth.63 The
court also cited to the Restatement of Torts for the proposition that no
action lies under the traditional common law for prenatal injuries.64
Drabbels also relied on Allaire v. St. Luke's Hospital65 as persua-
sive authority for three additional arguments against recognizing a
cause of action for prenatal injuries: (1) the recognition of this cause
of action is for the legislature to establish; (2) there is no precedent for
the recognition of such a cause of action on behalf of a stillborn fetus;
and (3) if an action for wrongful death of an unborn child is allowed,
the same action would have to be permitted against the fetus' mother
for negligence during pregnancy (implying that such a notion would
be absurd).66
Drabbels next cited to Magnolia Coca Cola Bottling Co. v. Jordan 67
as persuasive authority for the arguments that recognition of the
cause of action would result in a high probability of fraudulent claims
and an impossibility of adequately proving causation.68
60. Drabbels v. Skelly Oil Co., 155 Neb. 17, 18-19, 50 N.W.2d 229, 230 (1951).
61. Id. at 19, 50 N.W.2d at 230.
62. 138 Mass. 14 (1884).
63. Drabbels v. Skelly Oil Co., 155 Neb. 17, 19-20, 50 N.W.2d 229, 231 (1951). But see
Torigian v. Watertown News Co., 352 Mass. 446, 225 N.E.2d 926 (1967).
64. Drabbels v. Skelly Oil Co., 155 Neb. 17, 21, 50 N.W.2d 229, 231 (1951) (citing RE-
STATEMENT OF TORTS § 869 (1939)).
65. 184 Ill. 359, 56 N.E. 638 (1900).
66. Drabbels v. Skelly Oil Co., 155 Neb. 17, 20-21, 50 N.W.2d 229, 231 (1951) (citing
Allaire v. St. Luke's Hosp., 184 Ill. 359, 367-68, 56 N.E. 638, 640 (1900)).
67. 124 Tex. 347, 78 S.W.2d 944 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1935).
68. Drabbels v. Skelly Oil Co., 155 Neb. 17, 21, 50 N.W.2d 229, 231 (1951) (citing Mag-




Every argument provided by Drabbels and subsequently relied on
by Smith can be either logically refuted or shown to be obsolete. Since
Smith relied on Drabbels without exception or explanation, a refuta-
tion of the Drabbels rationale lessens the value of the court's holding
in Smith. The numeric count of jurisdictions accepting a statutory
wrongful death action on behalf of a stillborn child at the time Smith
was decided differs considerably from the count at the time of Drab-
bels. At the very least, a clear majority of jurisdictions allowed such a
cause of action at the time of Smith,69 thereby making Drabbels obso-
lete. Medical science has also advanced considerably since the early
common law, and today the unborn fetus, at least after viability, is
generally considered to be separate from its mother.7 0 Deitrich was
essentially overruled in 1967,71 and the most recent update of the Re-
statement (Second) of Torts no longer forecloses a cause of action by a
stillborn child for prenatal injuries resulting in death.72
Not only has Allaire v. St. Luke's Hospital been overruled, 73 but
the arguments on which that case relied are subject to refutation. The
most persuasive argument of that case was deference to the legislature
to specifically create a cause of action for the wrongful death of the
stillborn child.74 This argument is a clear abdication of judicial duty.
It is a longstanding principle that the legislature is assigned the task of
making the laws, and the judiciary must interpret those laws. By de-
ferring to the legislature in this case, the court actually denied applica-
tion of the wrongful death statute created by the legislature.
The argument used by Allaire and relied on by Drabbels that there
is no precedent for the recognition of such an action75 no longer ap-
plies in the face of a clear majority trend to recognize a cause of action
for the wrongful death of a stillborn, viable fetus.7 6 Allaire found the
logical consequence of allowing a cause of action for the wrongful
death of a stillborn child would be that the court would have to allow
the same action against the mother of the unborn child.77 While rec-
69. See Note, DiDonato, supra note 23, at 214; Note, Witty, supra note 23, at 997
n.121.
70. See Comment, Summerfield v. Superior Court. Fetal Wrongful Death Actions in
Arizona, 28 ARIz. L. REv. 109, 113 (1986). See also Note, DiDonato, supra note 23,
at 214.
71. Torigian v. Watertown News Co., 352 Mass. 446, 225 N.E.2d 926 (1967). See also
Mone v. Greyhound Lines, 368 Mass. 354, 331 N.E.2d 916 (1975).
72. RESTATFMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 869 & comment f (1986).
73. Chrisafogeorgis v. Brandenberg, 55 I1.2d 368, 304 N.E.2d 88 (1973) (holding that a
cause of action exists on behalf of a stillborn, viable fetus under the Illinois
wrongful death statute).
74. Allaire v. St. Luke's Hosp., 184 Mll. 359, 367-68, 56 N.E. 638, 640 (1900).
75. See Drabbels v. Skelly Oil Co., 155 Neb. 17, 20, 50 N.W.2d 229, 231 (1951) (citing
Allaire v. St. Luke's Hosp., 184 111. 359, 367, 56 N.E. 638, 640 (1900)).
76. See supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text.
77. Allaire v. St. Luke's Hosp., 184 IM. 359, 368, 56 N.E. 638, 640 (1900).
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ognizing that such an action could be brought, it is clearly distinguish-
able from a cause of action for the wrongful death of a stillborn child
and could be addressed without denying such a cause of action.
Drabbels' reliance on Magnolia Coca Cola Bottling Co. v. Jordan
allowed the court to use two traditional arguments against the cause
of action for the wrongful death of a stillborn child. However, these
arguments have long been rejected by courts as insufficient to deny
the cause of action. The possibility of fraudulent claims is a concern
which arises in any cause of action, and "if the common law has vital-
ity it should be elastic enough to provide safeguards against fraudulent
and speculative claims."78 The difficulty in proving causation is also
an insufficient reason to deny the cause of action because this diffi-
culty works against the plaintiff, and therefore should not foreclose
the plaintiff's right to try to prove the elements of the action.79
Additionally, although Drabbels noted the dissent's argument in
Allaire that a viable, unborn fetus should be considered a person for
purposes of wrongful death recovery, the court failed to discuss the
merit of this argument.8 0 By quoting from Allaire, Drabbels made an
argument for recognition of the cause of action it denied. By failing to
refute the argument, Drabbels lent merit to the proposition that the
cause of action should be recognized.
b. Analysis of Egbert
The court in Egbert was faced with a challenge to the rule estab-
lished in Drabbels that no cause of action was allowed on behalf of a
stillborn child under the Nebraska wrongful death statute.8 1 Egbert
refused to distinguish or overrule Drabbels. Egbert involved an action
brought by the parents of a stillborn, viable fetus. The parents alleged
the defendant negligently drove her automobile thereby causing a col-
lision with the pregnant mother's car and the death of the eight-
month-old unborn fetus. The Nebraska District Court for Douglas
County sustained the defendant's demurrer to the plaintiff's petition
and subsequently dismissed the plaintiff's action for the wrongful
death of the stillborn, viable fetus.8 2
The arguments relied on by Egbert in denying the plaintiff's action
dealt mainly with the legislative intent behind the wrongful death
statute. The court refused to recognize a common-law action for this
injury, holding it could only interpret the existing wrongful death
statute. The court looked to the intention of the legislature with re-
gard to the status of an unborn fetus under the statute at the time the
78. 1 S. SPEISER, supra note 28, § 438, at 560-61.
79. See Presley v. Newport Hosp., 117 R.I. 177, 189, 365 A.2d 748, 754 (1976).
80. Drabbels v. Skelly Oil Co., 155 Neb. 17, 21-22, 50 N.W.2d 229, 231-32 (1951).
81. Egbert v. Wenzl, 199 Neb. 573, 260 N.W.2d 480 (1977).
82. Id. at 573-74, 260 N.W.2d at 481.
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statute was enacted. The court found the plaintiff's action was outside
the statute because, at the time of the enactment of the statute, the
common law did not recognize a fetus as a person.83 Egbert also noted
that had the legislature wanted to include an unborn fetus within the
purview of the statute, the legislature could have done so specifi-
cally.84 Finally, the court said that the inaction of the legislature with
regard to the Nebraska wrongful death statute since Drabbels evi-
denced the legislature's agreement with the interpretation of the
court in that case.8 5 Egbert cited to three cases from other jurisdic-
tions which relied on this same "legislative deferral" argument.8 6
The arguments used to justify the court's decision in Egbert can
also be refuted and shown to be antiquated. Because Smith relied so
heavily on Egbert and Drabbels, a weakening of the Egbert arguments
also weakens Smith's rationale.
Egbert's first argument relied on a lack of precedent for the recog-
nition of the statutory cause of action for the wrongful death of a still-
born fetus. This argument is no longer true today, and was also not
true in 1986 when Smith was decided.87 Egbert next attempted to de-
termine the legislative intent behind Nebraska's wrongful death stat-
ute. There may have been no legislative intent as to the recognition of
a fetus within the purview of the statute at the time the statute was
adopted.88 However, the legislative intent of statutes adopting the
common law as the background must necessarily assume that the com-
mon law is not static, but rather is changing. The legislature must
have intended that the common law would supplement the statutes
and assumed that the status of the common law is evolving.
Egbert relied on three cases which it said were indicative of the
trend among courts to refuse to recognize the cause of action. Two of
the three cases relied on have since been overruled in states that have
joined the trend to recognize the cause of action.89
83. Id. at 574-76, 260 N.W.2d at 481-82.
84. 1d. at 576, 260 N.W.2d at 482.
85. Id.
86. Id. (citing State ex rel. Hardin v. Sanders, 538 S.W.2d 336 (Mo. 1976); Kilmer v.
Hicks, 22 Ariz. App. 552, 529 P.2d 706 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1974); McKillip v. Zimmer-
man, 191 N.W.2d 706 (Iowa 1971)).
87. See Note, DiDonato, supra note 23, at 214; Note, Witty, supra note 23, at 997
n.121.
88. See ag., Summerfield v. Superior Court, 144 Ariz. 467, 475, 698 P.2d 712, 720
(1985).
89. Compare State ex rel. Hardin v. Sanders, 538 S.W.2d 336 (Mo. 1976) (en banc) (no
cause of action allowed on behalf of stillborn child under Missouri wrongful
death statute) with O'Grady v. Brown, 654 S.W.2d 904 (Mo. 1983) (en banc) (cause
of action allowed on behalf of stillborn child under Missouri wrongful death stat-
ute (overruling Hardin)). Compare Kilmer v. Hicks, 22 Ariz. App. 552, 529 P.2d
706 (Axiz. Ct. App. 1974) (no cause of action allowed on behalf of stillborn child
under Missouri wrongful death statute) with Summerfield v. Superior Court, 144
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Additionally, the argument in Egbert pointing to legislative inac-
tion to change the language of the wrongful death statute in Nebraska
since the court's holding in Drabbels is equally unpersuasive. The op-
position to this argument relies on the principal that it is the legisla-
ture's duty to make laws and the judiciary's duty to interpret them.
The process of amending statutes is clearly a political one which in
many cases depends not on the intention of the legislature, but rather
on political forces outside the merits of the legislation.SO
Because all of the arguments supporting the holding in Egbert have
been shown to be unprincipled and antiquated, Smith should have at
least justified its holding on arguments that take into account the
change in the state of the law and in society since the decisions in
Drabbels and Egbert.
2. Neglect of Evidence of Medical Advances
There are several new arguments which go directly to the court's
finding that a fetus is not a "person" for purposes of the wrongful
death statute. Smith retained the traditional theory that a fetus is a
part of the mother until live birth.91 This argument is no longer valid
in the face of advances in the medical field regarding the diagnosis and
treatment of the fetus before birth.92
Dr. Jeffrey L. Lenow, M.D., chronicled the dramatic advances in
obstetrics and perinatology which have increased the chances for the
healthy survival of children through the application of the physician's
talents to the fetus before birth.93 "[Fietuses can successfully be diag-
nosed and treated in utero, regardless of viability, for a number of dis-
orders that would otherwise result in fetal demise or post-birth
abnormalities."94 Lenow has also noted the medical technology which
allows visualizing, monitoring, and measuring fetal activity before
birth and the increased diagnostic skills made possible by these medi-
cal advances.9 5 Fetal surgery is gaining common acceptance as doctors
are now able to treat certain defects with medicines administered
Ariz. 467, 698 P.2d 712 (1985) (cause of action allowed on behalf of stillborn child
under Arizona wrongful death statute (overruling Kilmer)).
90. See, e.g., Summerfield v. Superior Court, 144 Ariz. 467,478-79, 698 P.2d 712,723-24
(1985).
91. Smith v. Columbus Community Hosp., 222 Neb. 776, 778, 387 N.W.2d 490, 491
(1986) (citing Drabbels v. Skelly Oil Co., 155 Neb. 17, 22, 50 N.W.2d 229, 232
(1951)).
92. See, e.g., Amadio v. Levin, 509 Pa. 199, 219-20, 501 A.2d 1085, 1095 (1985) (Zappala,
J., concurring).
93. Lenow, The Fetus as a Patient- Emerging Rights as a Person?, 9 AM. J.L. & MED.
1 (1983).
94. Id. at 15.
95. Id. at 15-16.
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orally to the mother or directly into the amniotic fluid.96 Lenow de-
scribed one case involving fetal surgery in which the fetus was par-
tially removed from its mother's uterus and onto an open operating
field.97 As a result of these advances in fetal treatment, Lenow con-
cluded that there is an emerging concept of the fetus as a patient
which is owed a duty of care by the physician.9 8
However, most courts which have allowed a cause of action for the
wrongful death of a stillborn fetus have allowed the action only for a
viable fetus.9 9 The argument is that at viability, the fetus could live
separate from the mother and should be considered as a separate en-
tity from the mother both biologically and legally.1o
The Nebraska Supreme Court in Smith should have judicially rec-
ognized the changes in medical science and especially in the science of
fetal medicine since Drabbels and Egbert. In the face of such advances
in the biological underpinnings of the old rule that the fetus is part of
the mother until birth, Smith should have provided some new expla-
nation for its reaffirmation of the old rule.
3. Trend Toward Recognizing a Cause of Action
Four persuasive arguments in favor of recognizing a cause of action
for the wrongful death of an unborn fetus have been presented by the
courts in states following the trend toward recognition. These argu-
ments were not addressed by Smith and merit discussion here because
they are persuasive, well-reasoned arguments which would be hard to
ignore if addressed by the Nebraska Supreme Court. The arguments
include (1) a general legislative policy in favor of protecting the un-
born; (2) consideration of the remedial nature of the wrongful death
statute and its interpretation to achieve that remedial purpose; (3) the
recognition by the Supreme Court in Roe v. Wade101 of the use of
96. Id. at 16. The advent of fetal surgery has produced documented cases of treat-
ment of intracranial pressure in an unborn fetus. See id at 16 & n.102. See also J.
PRrrCHARD & P. MACDONALD, W~iuAms OSTETRics vii (16th ed. 1980) ("Hap-
pily, we have entered an era in which the fetus can be rightfully considered and
treated as our second patient.... Fetal diagnosis and therapy have now emerged
as legitimate tools the obstetrician must possess .... )
97. Lenow, supra note 93, at 17. This procedure was used to correct a urinary tract
abnormality in a 21-week-old fetus with urethral obstruction. Id.
98. Id. See aso Summerfield v. Superior Court, 144 Ariz. 467, 477, 698 P.2d 712, 722
(1985) (discussion of the advances in medicine which may mean the "magic mo-
ment of 'birth' is no longer [entirely] determined by nature").
99. See Note, Witty, supra note 23, at 998.
100. See, ag., Amadio v. Levin, 501 Pa. 199, 218-19, 501 A.2d 1085, 1095 (1985) (Zappala,
J., concurring) (the mother and child are two distinct entities-the child has a
separate system of circulation, maintains a separate heartbeat (with a heartrate
more rapid than that of the mother's), and is independent of the mother except
for sustenance).
101. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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state wrongful death statutes to protect the unborn; and (4) the "di-
lemma of the twins."
The first argument involves those jurisdictions which determine
that the intent of the legislature regarding the fetus as a person within
the wrongful death statute is unknown and therefore must be divined.
Those states look for general legislative policies in other statutes
within the state which protect the unborn.102 Nebraska statutes con-
tain many of the types of legislation which these courts look to as evi-
dence that the general legislative intent is to protect the unborn and
that this intent should be applied to the interpretation of the wrongful
death statute.
The first statute which could be advanced to evidence legislative
intent to protect the unborn is the protection of the property rights of
the unborn fetus through the intestate succession statutes within the
state. In Nebraska, the statute on intestate succession dealing with
afterborn heirslo3 protects the rights of an unborn fetus to share in
intestate succession upon its birth.
The second type of legislation evidencing legislative intent to pro-
tect the unborn is the abortion statutes.104 Nebraska specifically de-
clares its legislative intent to protect the lives of the unborn. 05
Experimentation is prohibited on any premature infant aborted alive,
102. See, e.g., Summerfield v. Superior Court, 144 Ariz. 467, 475-76, 698 P.2d 712, 720-21
(1985); Amadio v. Levin, 509 Pa. 199, 229, 501 A.2d 1085, 1100 (1985) (Zappala, J.,
concurring); O'Grady v. Brown, 654 S.W.2d 904, 909-10 (Mo. 1983) (en banc); Vail-
lancourt v. Medical Ctr. Hosp., 139 Vt. 138, 141-42, 425 A.2d 92, 94 (1980).
103. NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-2307 (1985).
104. Id. § 28-325 to -347.
105. Section 28-325 (1985) provides:
The Legislature hereby finds and declares:
(1) That the following provisions were motivated by the legislative
intrusion of the United States Supreme Court by virtue of its decision
removing the protection afforded the unborn. Sections 28-325 to 28-345
are in no way to be construed as legislatively encouraging abortions at
any stage of unborn human development, but is rather an expression of
the will of the people of the State of Nebraska and the members of the
Legislature to provide protection for the life of the unborn child when-
ever possible;
(2) That the members of the Legislature expressly deplore the de-
struction of the unborn human lives which has and will occur in Ne-
braska as a consequence of the United States Supreme Court's decision
on abortion of January 22, 1973;
(3) That it is in the interest of the people of the State of Nebraska
that every precaution be taken to insure the protection of every viable
unborn child being aborted, and every precaution be taken to provide
life-supportive procedures to insure the unborn child its continued life
after its abortion;
(4) That currently this state is prevented from providing adequate
legal remedies to protect the life, health, and welfare of pregnant women
and unborn human life ....
NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-325 (1985).
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except to preserve the life or health of the child.306 Abortions are not
allowed to be performed if the unborn child has reached viability, ex-
cept to protect the life of the mother. 0 7 If an abortion is performed,
the physician is required to take all reasonable steps for the protection
of the life of the viable, unborn child.108 The intentional violation of
any of these statutes is considered a Class IV felony. 09
The Nebraska Legislature also recognizes the need to protect the
unborn child in the Anatomical Gift Act' 10 which allows a stillborn
child's body to be donated. Nebraska statutes also provide for a death
certificate to be issued for the death of a fetus."'1 Further, a paternity
action may be instituted before the birth of a child.112 These statutes
clearly indicate a general legislative policy in favor of protecting the
unborn. The Nebraska Supreme Court in Smith could have relied on
this general legislative policy in forming an argument for recognizing
the plaintiff's cause of action for the wrongful death of a stillborn,
viable fetus.
The second argument pointed to by the majority trend of cases is
the need to interpret the wrongful death statute in light of the reme-
dial nature of that statute.13 One of the purposes of the wrongful
death statute is that the statute is a method of compensating survivors
and preventing the injustice of allowing a tortfeasor to go without pen-
alty for killing where he would have been liable if he had only injured
his victim. The cases that recognize this argument point to the pur-
poses of the statute as evidencing the need for the judiciary to liberally
construe the statute to achieve those purposes. Because the wrongful
death statute is seen as a method of providing a remedy for wrongfully
caused death, the judiciary feels compelled to liberally construe the
statute to achieve that purpose.
The purposes cited to by the courts are achieved by allowing recov-
ery for the wrongful death of a stillborn child. The survivors are com-
pensated for their loss, and an injustice is prevented which would have
allowed the tortfeasor to kill with impunity. These purposes apply
106. Id. § 28-346.
107. Id. § 28-329.
108. Id. § 28-331.
109. Id. § 28-332, -346. Additionally, section 28-337 allows hospitals and clinics to re-
fuse to perform abortions; section 28-338 allows any physician to refuse to per-
form an abortion; section 28-339 makes the discrimination against a physician
who refuses to perform abortions a Class II misdemeanor, sections 28-340 to -341
create a civil action to allow a remedy in the form of damages or injunctive relief
for such discrimination; and section 28-343 requires that all abortions be reported
to the Nebraska Department of Health. Id. §§ 28-337 to -341, -343.
110. NEB. REv. STAT. § 71-4801(2) (1986).
111. Id. § 71-606.
112. NEB. REv. STAT. § 43-1411 (1988).
113. See, ag., Amadio v. Levin, 509 Pa. 199, 205, 501 A.2d 1085,1087-88 (1985); O'Grady
v. Brown, 654 S.W.2d 904, 907-08 (Mo. 1983) (en bane).
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equally to the Nebraska wrongful death statute. Smith could have
recognized these purposes and interpreted the statute to achieve these
purposes, thereby allowing a cause of action for the wrongful death of
a stillborn child.
Roe v. Wade 114 is cited by older cases as prohibiting a cause of ac-
tion for the wrongful death of a stillborn child,115 but more recent
cases find distinguishing factors between the issues presented in
wrongful death actions and those presented in Roe.116 The older cases
argue that because the United States Supreme Court has refused to
recognize a nonviable fetus as a "person" within the protection of the
fourteenth amendment, the unborn fetus should not be protected by
the state's recognition of a cause of action for the wrongful death of an
unborn child.117
More recent cases correctly note that the issues involved in the two
cases are very distinct.11 8 Roe is seen as a balancing of the constitu-
tionally protected privacy interests of the mother with the state's in-
terests in protecting the unborn. The issue in the cases involving
wrongful death actions brought on behalf of a stillborn child involves
no balancing of privacy interests against state interests.119 Roe specifi-
cally recognized the state's right to protect the unborn in contexts
where the protection does not interfere with the privacy rights of
others.120 More conclusively, Roe recognized that some states already
did allow wrongful death actions to be brought on behalf of the
unborn.121
Finally, the most well-known argument in favor of recognition of a
statutory cause of action for the wrongful death of an unborn fetus is
sometimes referred to as "the dilemma of the twins."122 The argu-
ment refers to the inconsistency in allowing an action for wrongful
death resulting from prenatal injuries where the child is born alive
and lives for a short time and not allowing an action for wrongful
death where the prenatal injury causes death to the child before it can
114. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
115. See Note, DiDonato, supra note 23, at 220 & n.129.
116. See, e.g., Summerfield v. Superior Court, 144 Ariz. 467, 477-78, 698 P.2d 712, 722-23
(1985); O'Grady v. Brown, 654 S.W.2d 904, 909-10 (Mo. 1983) (en bane).
117. See, e.g., Toth v. Goree, 65 Mich. App. 296, 303-04, 237 N.W.2d 297, 301 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1975).
118. See Note, DiDonato, supra note 23, at 220-21.
119. See Toth v. Goree, 65 Mich. App. 296, 312, 237 N.W.2d 297, 305 (Mich. Ct. App.
1975) (Maher, J., dissenting) (tortfeasor should not be allowed to use the privacy
rights of the mother to escape liability for the death of the unborn child).
120. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 161-62 (1973).
121. Id. at 162.
122. See generally Note, The Fetus as a Person in Wrongful Death Actions, 57 U.
CoLO. L. REv. 895, 900-01, 904-06 (1986) (discussing the rationale of the "dillema
of the twins" argument).
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be born.=23 Such an inconsistency in the law is unjustifiable. This
kind of an arbitrary line drawn at live birth is no longer acceptable in
light of advances in medical science making the timing of live birth no
longer solely in the hands of nature. 124
IV. CONCLUSION
Smith reaffirmed the antiquated rule denying parents a right to
bring a statutory action for the wrongful death of their stillborn child.
Smith ignored changes in medical science, the majority trend in favor
of recognition of the cause of action, and the persuasive arguments
from those jurisdictions which allow a wrongful death action on behalf
of a stillborn, viable fetus. The court should have adopted the better-
reasoned view in recognition of Nebraska legislative policies favoring
protection of the unborn and should have allowed Mrs. Smith to re-
cover for the wrongful death of her stillborn, viable child.
Sherry L. Hubert '89
123. See Todd v. Sandidge Constr. Co., 341 F.2d 75, 76-77 (4th Cir. 1964); Moen v. Han-
son, 85 Wash. 2d 597, 601, 537 P.2d 266, 268 (1975) (en banc); Verkennes v.
Corniea, 229 inn. 365, 369, 38 N.W.2d 838, 840 (1949).
124. See Summerfield v. Superior Court, 144 Ariz. 467, 477, 698 P.2d 712, 722 (1985).
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